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In recent years, much has been written 
about how increasing labour costs in 
China—among other factors—are pushing 
investors to move labour-intensive 
production to other countries where wages 
are still low. Due to its moderate capital 
requirements, low level of automation, and 
minimal demands in terms of skills, the 
garment industry is one of the sectors in 
which China’s loss of competitiveness is felt 
most acutely—especially as other countries, 
such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
and Cambodia, adopt policy after policy 
to entice foreign investors. But what does 
this shift in global capital trends entail for 
workers? How do the workforces in these 
new outsourcing destinations fare compared 
to their Chinese counterparts? There is no 
easy answer to these questions. Indeed, 
while the past two decades have seen a broad 
theoretical debate about the consequences 
and extent of the global ‘race to the bottom’ 
in labour standards, not much attention 
has yet been paid to the human costs of the 
wave of capital flight that is taking place in 
the wake of China’s industrial upgrade. To 
address this gap, in this essay I will compare 
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garment workers in China and Cambodia, 
considering the wages they receive in the 
context of their expectations and needs. 
The choice of these two countries is 
dictated by the fact that the garment industry 
in China and Cambodia is at two different 
stages of development. While China remains 
the undisputed global leader in the industry, 
with its 2015 exports worth approximately 
274 billion USD, there are already signs that 
the Chinese garment sector is unravelling 
due to rising labour costs, as the country 
embarks on an ambitious path of industrial 
upgrading (Van Der Kamp 2016). The 
Cambodian garment industry, on the other 
hand, was only established in the mid-1990s, 
when Cambodia finally emerged from more 
than two decades of chaos, and maintains a 
positive outlook. Having started from barely 
80 million USD of exports in 1996, in 2015, 
the Cambodian garment sector had become a 
6.8 billion USD industry, the ninth largest in 
the world (ILO 2017). Of course, the weight 
of the two industries within their respective 
local economies is very different. While the 
garment industry today plays a relatively 
minor role in China—in 2015 only 12 percent 
of the Chinese merchandise exports were in 
the garment sector—Cambodia’s economic 
growth remains heavily dependent on 
garment production, with about 610,000 
workers employed in the sector in 2016 and 
as much as 80 percent of the country’s total 
merchandise exports in the same year being 
garment and footwear products.
To explore these different contexts, 
during the summer of 2016 I undertook two 
surveys. The first was conducted in June 
and July 2016 at three Hong Kong-owned 
garment factories in Dongguan, Guangdong 
province. These factories employed 2,000, 
1,000, and 800 workers respectively, and I 
was able to collect a total of 250 completed 
questionnaires. The second survey was 
carried out from July to September 2016 in 
three Hong Kong-owned garment factories in 
Phnom Penh, where most of the Cambodian 
garment industry is concentrated. In this 
case, the factories employed 5,700, 2,100, 
and 1,100 workers, and I collected a total of 
291 questionnaires. To avoid interference 
from the management and possible 
biases in the responses of the workers, all 
respondents were approached outside the 
factory without prior knowledge of their 
employer. Most often, the meetings took 
place in the safety of their accommodation 
after their shift had ended or in restaurants 
around the factory during their lunch break. 
The quantitative data were supplemented 
with forty semi-structured interviews with 
garment workers employed in the sampled 
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factories in both countries, plus additional 
interviews with local lawyers specialising in 
labour disputes, union leaders, and labour 
activists.
Basic Guarantees
The two graphs that accompany this 
essay summarise my findings. The first 
aspect to consider when comparing the two 
countries is the level of wages guaranteed 
by law, i.e. the local minimum wage. This is 
depicted in the first column in both graphs. 
According to the Chinese labour legislation, 
local governments in China are allowed to 
decide their own minimum wage through a 
process of tripartite consultation between 
local labour departments, the official 
trade union, and business associations. In 
setting the amount, these actors have to 
consider several factors, including the cost 
of living, the percentage of social security 
contributions paid by the workers, the 
average salary in the area, the unemployment 
rate, and the local level of development. At 
the time of the survey, the minimum wage 
in Dongguan was set at 1,510 RMB (roughly 
229 USD) per month. In Cambodia, in 2016, 
authorities announced their intention to 
pass a Minimum Wage Law that would lay 
the foundations for a ‘universal minimum 
wage’ to be determined every year through 
‘tripartite consultation’ (Bun and Davis 
2016). However, currently only the 
garment and footwear sector is covered 
by a minimum wage, which is the same for 
the whole country. The amount is decided 
every year by the central government on the 
basis of the recommendation coming from 
a tripartite Labour Advisory Committee 
composed of 28 representatives. Of these, 
14 come from the government, 7 from the 
employers associations, and 7 from the 
unions (5 of which are considered pro-
government). At the time of the survey, the 
Cambodian minimum wage was set at 140 
USD per month. 
While in China there are no reported 
strikes related to minimum wage, in 
Cambodia the issue is at the centre of much 
controversy. In early January 2014, massive 
strikes and demonstrations of garment 
workers protesting over the government’s 
refusal to raise the minimum wage ended 
in a bloodbath after the intervention of 
the military police (AMRC 2014). Due 
to the increasing repression of civil 
society and independent unions by the 
Cambodian authorities (see also Norén-
Nilsson’s chapter in the present volume), 
the following years have seen no more 
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mass demonstrations during the minimum 
wage negotiations. Nevertheless, the raises 
that were granted by the government have 
continually fallen short of the expectations 
of independent trade unions and workers—
with the exception of 2017, when the ruling 
party, concerned about its performance at 
the impending national elections, actually 
granted a minimum wage rise in line with 
the demands of the unions, which went into 
effect in January 2018 (Sineat and Baliga 
2017). In 2016, for instance, independent 
unions pushed for a new monthly minimum 
wage of no less than 171 USD, but the 
government settled on a figure of 153 USD, 
far closer to the 147 USD proposed by the 
garment employer association (Baliga and 
Samean 2016). This was far lower than 
the 177 USD that some local and global 
trade unions and advocacy groups had 
been demanding as a ‘living wage’ for 
Cambodian garment workers since 2014 
(Clean Clothes Campaign 2015). In light of 
these controversies, it is unsurprising that 
the draft Minimum Wage Law mentioned 
above introduces severe restrictions on the 
ability of independent unions to negotiate 
for higher minimum wages. One example of 
this is the inclusion of clauses that allow for 
fines of up to 1,250 USD for those ‘creating 
obstacles or putting illegal pressure on 
discussions to determine the minimum 
wage’, or up to 2,500 USD for anyone who 
‘incites activities against the declaration of 
the minimum wage’ (Bun and Davis 2016). 
Why do negotiations about the minimum 
wage elicit such different responses from 
Chinese and Cambodian workers? The 
reason can be found in the second column of 
both graphs, which depicts the basic wage, 
i.e. the monthly amount that the factories 
guarantee to the workers regardless of their 
actual workload. While the Cambodian 
factories offered a basic wage that coincided 
with the minimum wage, in China the 
basic wage was significantly higher (41.1 
percent more) than the legal minimum. 
The explanation for this disparity can 
be found in the cyclical ‘labour famines’ 
(mingonghuang) that have hit coastal areas 
in China, including Guangdong province, 
since the early 2000s (Zhang and Liu 2012). 
With many young Chinese rural women 
deciding to stay home to raise a family or 
to look for a job in townships closer to their 
hometowns, companies in labour-intensive 
sectors such as the garment industry have 
no other choice than to offer salaries higher 
than the legal minimum in order to attract 
workers. This means that while increases 
in the minimum wage in Cambodia have a 
direct impact on the income of the workers, 
in China workers already receive higher 
basic salaries and therefore do not have a 
large stake in the government’s decisions 
on the matter. Most importantly, it shows 
that due to reasons related to demography, 
as much as to local development, Chinese 
workers have much more bargaining power 
than their Cambodian counterparts—a much 
more threatening prospect for investors 
than a difference of a few dozen dollars in 
the minimum wages.
Expectations and 
Perceived Needs
Minimum wages are simply a bottom line 
that is somehow supposed to protect workers 
from extreme exploitation, providing them 
with the guarantee of an income at times 
when production slows down due to the 
paucity of orders. As such, they do not 
reflect the actual level of remuneration 
that the workers receive, which in both 
China and Cambodia largely depends on 
the amount of overtime work. The Chinese 
workers in my sample worked an average of 
10.3 hours a day from Monday to Friday, plus 
an average of 9.9 hours on Saturdays, with 
only Sundays off. This is a clear violation of 
the national labour law, which states that 
workers should work no more than 8 hours a 
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day and 44 hours a week, with a maximum of 
36 hours of overtime a month. In Cambodia, 
the workers worked 9.7 hours a day from 
Monday to Saturday and got only one day off 
every two weeks, another clear violation of 
the national legislation, which allows for 48 
hours a week, with no more than 2 hours of 
overtime a day. 
Due to the large amount of overtime, 
workers in both countries were able to 
earn more than the local minimum wage. 
This can be seen clearly from the fourth 
column of both graphs, which depicts the 
take-home wage, i.e. how much the workers 
were actually paid after taxes and other 
deductions for social security. In absolute 
terms, Chinese garment workers received 
much higher take-home wages compared to 
their Cambodian counterparts. While the 
Chinese workers in my sample were given 
an average take-home wage of 3,001.76 RMB 
(roughly 450.30 USD) a month, Cambodian 
workers were paid only 243.53 USD, a 
gap which would most likely widen if the 
survey also included the costs born by the 
companies for social insurance and other 
welfare-related expenses, burdensome in 
China and almost non-existent in Cambodia. 
In this sense, the assumption that rising 
labour costs underscores industrial 
relocations from China to other countries 
indeed has a strong foundation.
Significantly, both workforces were not 
satisfied with their remuneration levels. 
The third column of both graphs shows the 
desired basic wage, i.e. the response to the 
question ‘in a situation in which you have 
to work only 40 hours a week [48 hours in 
Cambodia] and do not have to work overtime, 
how much do you think a reasonable salary 
would be?’ Comparing the desired basic 
wage with the actual basic wage highlights 
that workers in both countries thought it 
reasonable to receive much higher wages 
for working only ordinary hours, with the 
Chinese workers wanting 53.1 percent more 
and the Cambodian workers wanting 44.1 
percent more. The same frustration emerged 
when the workers were asked about their 
desired take-home wage. The question, 
depicted in the fifth column of both graphs, 
was formulated as such: ‘Considering your 
current workload, how much do you think 
would be a reasonable salary for you?’ While 
Chinese workers considered 4,374.80 RMB 
(roughly 656.20 USD) to be a reasonable 
amount, 34.1 percent more than their take-
home wage, Cambodian workers desired 
304.53 USD, that is ‘only’ 25 percent more 
than what they were currently making. 
Still, the roots of this dissatisfaction 
cannot be understood without considering 
the perceived economic needs of the two 
workforces, which are displayed in the 
sixth column of the graphs. As mentioned 
above, international advocacy groups and 
Cambodian independent unions have been 
campaigning since 2014 for a living wage of 
177 USD per month. An unpublished survey 
undertaken by several unions and NGOs in 
Cambodia in June 2016 found that workers 
in Phnom Penh needed around 142 USD a 
month for their living expenditures. Yet, as 
Dennis Arnold has noted, ‘workers’ politics 
and livelihood concerns [in Cambodia] 
include and extend beyond the (peri-) urban 
factory floor to rural households’ (2017, 26). 
For this reason, in my survey I decided to 
go beyond basic living expenses and ask: 
‘On average, how much do you think you 
need every month to cover the basic living 
expenses of yourself and your immediate 
family (your partner, children, parents, or 
other people whom you have to support)?’ 
The responses were surprising, 
considering that living costs are much 
higher in Dongguan than in Phnom Penh. 
Cambodian workers felt they needed an 
average of 345 USD per month, more than 
the 1,958.80 RMB (roughly 293.80 USD) 
required by the Chinese workers. One initial 
explanation for this counterintuitive finding 
is that most Cambodian workers came from 
extended families—besides their parents, 
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84.2 percent of them had three siblings or 
more—with most family members remaining 
in the countryside to engage in agricultural 
work. A second reason is that while 82.4 
percent of the Chinese workers in my 
sample lived in a dormitory provided by 
the factory—evidence of the persistence of 
the so-called ‘dormitory labour regime’ in 
today’s China (Smith and Pun 2006)—and 
thus paid only a symbolic fee for water, gas, 
and electricity averaging 122 RMB (roughly 
18.30 USD) a month, Cambodian workers 
had to find private accommodation outside 
the factory, paying an average of 34.40 USD 
monthly. Chinese workers also had access 
to much cheaper food, paying 311.57 RMB 
(approximately 46.70 USD) for their meals 
on average, compared to the 71.66 USD 
paid by Cambodian workers. This disparity 
in expenses clearly affected the amount of 
funds sent home. While Chinese workers 
were able to remit 1,724.90 RMB (roughly 
258.70 USD) a month, i.e. 57.5 percent of 
their take-home wage, Cambodian workers 
could only send 67.55 USD, i.e. 22.2 percent 
of their take-home wage.
 
A Matter of Survival
What does this comparison tell us about 
the implications of the decline of the garment 
industry in China? First, it says that labour 
costs—as shown by the data on minimum 
wages and take-home wages— are indeed 
much higher in China than in Cambodia. 
This situation is further compounded if we 
consider the likely impact of the various 
costs related to social security and welfare 
that the companies must bear—costs which 
are substantial in China and almost non-
existent in Cambodia. Even more important, 
in order to face the challenges posed by 
demographic trends and local development, 
garment factories in China today often 
have no other choice than to offer better 
conditions than the legal minimum wage 
in order to attract workers. This is in 
stark contrast to Cambodia, where most 
employers have no incentive whatsoever to 
provide anything more than to what they are 
legally bound. In such a context, although 
China still offers advantages in terms of 
infrastructure and the availability of raw 
materials, investments in labour-intensive 
industry are likely to continue to desert the 
country. 
Second, my survey demonstrates that by 
relocating from China to Cambodia, investors 
perpetuate dynamics of exploitation. This 
emerges clearly from the data regarding 
the expectations and perceived needs of 
the workers in the two countries. While the 
Chinese workers in my sample were finally 
able to earn wages higher than what they felt 
they needed, their Cambodian counterparts 
still earned much less than their perceived 
needs. It was definitely not a coincidence 
that wages were never at the top of the list of 
the workers’ concerns during my interviews 
in China, while they regularly came up in 
my conversations in Cambodia. This does 
not mean that Chinese garment workers 
are happy with their remuneration—on 
the contrary, as we have seen, they still 
deem wages ‘unreasonable’ in light of their 
workload. Still, there is a fundamental 
difference between dissatisfaction due to 
the perceived unfairness of the economic 
treatment experienced in the workplace, 
as I found in China, and a deeper concern 
about the ability to provide a basic level of 
subsistence for oneself and one’s family, as 
I encountered in Cambodia. It is this kind 
of human cost that employers should bear 
in mind when deciding to relocate from one 
country to the next in their unending quest 
for lower costs and higher profits.
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